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Abstract
This paper studies bribery between a rm and a supervisor who monitors the rm
for compliance. Bribery occurs preemptively, that is before the supervisor exerts costly
e¤ort to discover the rms level of non-compliance and collect evidence for success-
ful prosecution. In contrast to previous papers, preemptive bribery is modeled as a
Bayesian signaling game because the supervisor is uninformed about the rms level
of non-compliance. We show that when the collection of evidence is independent of
the supervsiors knowledge of the rms level of non-compliance, some (possibly all)
rms always engage in preemptive bribery. However, if knowledge of the rms level
of non-compliance has implications for the supervisors ability to collect evidence and
prosecute, preemptive bribery can be completely eliminated. Results which apply to
preemptive bribery under complete information do not apply here.
1 Introduction
It is well recognized that corruption and bribery undermine enforcement e¤orts in various
regulatory settings. In particular, collusion between the supervisor who is in charge of
enforcement and the agent or rm that is being regulated, leads to dilution of enforcement.
While there is a sizeable literature on this, the focus is mostly on ex post collusion, which
takes place after the supervisor has collected evidence regarding the rms non-compliance
(Polinksy and Shavell 2000). Indeed, Mookherjee and Png (1995) provide a detailed analysis
of the conditions under which ex post bribery will occur and how it must be deterred.
However, bribery can occur even before the supervisor has carried out inspections. In other
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words, there is scope for preemptive bribery where the supervisor accepts a bribe in order
not to carry out any inspection (Bac 1998, Bag 1997, and Samuel 2009).
Preemptive bribery di¤ers from ex post bribery in two important aspects, which compli-
cates the analysis of its incidence and deterrence. On the one hand preemptive bribery is
more likely to occur because the coalition of the rm and the supervisor saves on the inspec-
tion costs by engaging in preemptive bribery and there is no risk of the evidence leaking
and being used in the future to prosecute the rm and the supervisor. On the other hand,
while ex-post bribery occurs after the rms non-compliance is observed by the supervi-
sor, preemptive bribery takes place with a relatively uninformed supervisor. Arguably, the
presence of asymmetric information may be su¢ cient to disrupt the preemptive bargaining
process, thereby, preventing preemptive bribery from occurring (as Ryvkin and Serra 2012
have shown in a di¤erent context).
The objective in this paper is to show that the incentives for collusion and the capacity
to deter it depend critically on when bribery takes place, that is whether preemptively or
ex pot, and the (related) informational environment in which it occurs. To achieve this,
we study bribery in a regulatory setting where a supervisor must exert costly e¤ort to nd
evidence regarding a rms pollution level, and conditional on successfully observing the
rms pollution level (or more broadly, its level of non-compliance with regulations), the
supervisor is required to report this compliance level to the regulator who imposes a ne on
the rm based on this report. We allow bribery to occur both preemptively under incomplete
information and ex-post under complete information.
Our study highlights the role of information as an important di¤erence between pre-
emptive and ex-post bribery and adds to the existing literature that examines whether a
principal can deter collusion by introducing imperfect information. Kofman and Lawarree
(1996), for example, show that a principal may hire two supervisors to inspect the same rm
sequentially. They show that if each supervsior does not know for certain whether she is the
rst or the second to inspect the rm, collusion is deterred.1 Similarly, Lambsdor¤ (2007),
using cross-country data, nds that uncertainty regarding the size of the bribe can reduce
corruption. In light of these ndings, and given the critical link between preemptive bribery
and information, it is useful to know whether preemptive bribery can still occur, or whether
the regulator can safely ignore preemptive bribery because asymmetric information makes
1Note that in their paper asymmetric information is between multiple supervisors whereas in our model
it is between the supervisor and the agent.
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it unlikely to occur. To address this issue, in this paper we develop a model to study pre-
emptive bribery under asymmetric information. To our knowledge ours is the rst attempt
at fully understanding the implications of asymmetric information for preemptive bribery.
We consider and enforcement setting where rms belong to one of three types: zero
waste (non-polluting), low waste, and high waste rms. Di¤erent levels of compliance attract
di¤erent mandated nes. Supervisors can easily observe whether a rm is a zero waste rm
or not, but cannot distinguish between low and high waste rms2. Of course, the supervisor
can exert costly e¤ort to gather evidence regarding the rms compliance level and as a
result may learn the actual level. Thus, the size of the ex-post bribe can be determined
by bargaining mechanisms under symmetric information. In contrast, preemptive bribery
occurs before the supervisor observes whether the rms actual type is known. Given this
information structure, we set up the game as a signalling game with incomplete information,
where the rm makes a bribe o¤er which the supervisor can accept or reject. Acceptance
leads to preemptive collusion where the accepted bribe is exchanged and the supervisor
does not undertake evidence gathering. Rejection leads to the supervisor exerting e¤ort
to collect evidence and subsequently engaging in ex-post bribery or truthful reporting.3
We characterize the entire set of (Bayesian Nash) equilibria of this game and show that
despite the presence of asymmetric information, it is not possible to prevent preemptive
collusion completely. As is well known, signalling games admit a plethora of equilibria. We
can have equilibria where both low and high waste rms pay preemptive bribes and are
never prosecuted, or equilibria where high waste rms pay a preemptive bribe and are never
prosecuted while low waste rms are prosecuted. Using standard renement criteria we show
that there is a unique equilibrium, where the high waste rms always engage in preemptive
bribery and escape prosecution, while the low waste rms are sometimes prosecuted. Hence,
informational asymmetry has limited deterrence for some of the rms.
An important issue to address when studying preemptive bribery under asymmetric in-
formation is whether the bribing process can reveal some information about the rms level
of waste, and whether this information can make the supervisors investigation more e¤ective
at a later stage in the game. We extend our basic model above to allow for the possibility
2An almost identical information structure is found in Celig (2008).
3The informational structure of this game is similar to Reinganum and Wildes (1986) analysis of litigation
and settlement. In this model only the plainti¤ knows the true level of damages. and makes a settlement
demand based on the true level of damages. The defendent infers the plainti¤s true damage level, and must
decide whether to settle or let the case go to trial.
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that "knowledge" of a rms type makes it easier for the supervisor to collect evidence for
prosecuting the rm. This possibility, referred to as the knowledge criterion, a¤ects the
preemptive bribery game drastically. We show that preemptive bribery can be eliminated
completely in the sense that the unique equilibrium outcome satisfying the knowledge cri-
terion is the outcome where none of the high waste rms successfully engage in preemptive
bribery. Thus our paper shows that whether informational asymmetries reduce the feasibil-
ity of preemptive bribery or not depends largely on whether this information can be utilized
by the supervisor to make subsequent inspections more e¤ective.
Our paper builds on the existing small literature on preemptive bribery. The possibility
of preemptive bribery and its e¢ ciency implications have been studied by Bac (1998), Bag
(1997) and Samuel (2009). They show that even when it is optimal to deter ex-post bribery,
preemptive bribery might be tolerated becasue it is e¢ cient. Moreover, when bribery can
occur both preemptively and ex-post, it can be shown that policies eliminating ex-post
bribery may incentivize preemptive bribery. But, in these papers the informational aspects
of preemptive bribery are ignored. For example, Samuel (2009) avoids the information
problem with preemptive bribery by distinguishing between hard" and soft" information.4
Specically, he assumes that the supervisor knows whether the rm is compliant or not
without exerting e¤ort, but that this information is soft". In order to obtain hard evidence
regarding the rms non-compliance, which is necessary in order to impose a ne on the rm,
supervisors must exert e¤ort. Thus, the preemptive bribe is determined within a complete
information setting since the rm and the supervisor know the exact level of compliance,
although this information is soft.
More importantly, our results regarding the incentives for preemptive bribery stand in
sharp contrast to results in the existing litearture. Specically, Bac (1998) and Samuel and
Lowen (2010) show that improving the supervisors ability to monitor the rm, or lowering the
supervisors cost of monitoring, encourage preemptive bribery. Thus, improvements in the
ability of the supervisor to obtain hard information regarding the rms type can sometimes
encourage corruption. In contrast, in our model with incomplete information, improving
the supervisors ability to obtain hard information discourages bribery and increases the
frequency that some rms will be prosecuted. Additionally, we show that raising the nes
4Hard information refers to information that is (costlessly) veriable by third parties (see Baliga (1999),
Tirole (1992) for a discussion of this issue). Relatedly, Khalil et al. (2010) study the role of hard and
soft information on bribery and extortion. In contrast to other papers, they assume that information is
hard" when the supervisor acts alone, but is soft" for the supervisor, rm coalition because they collude
to fabricate evidence.
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for high waste rms can reduce the frequency of bribery among low waste rms. This is in
contrast to nearly all the previous literature on preemptive corruption, where raising the ne
unambiguously encourages bribery.
Our result concerning the importance of information for the feasibility of preemptive
bribery is related to a few other papers on corruption and crime. Motta (2009) studies
preemptive bribery under asymmetric information in a model of tax evasion. In his model
the supervisor only knows the distribution of incomes, but not the income of an individual tax
payer. Therefore, in contrast to our paper where the preemptive bribe may di¤er according
to the level of compliance, in his paper the supervisor chooses a single preemptive bribe that
maximizes the overall gains from preemptive bribery. Thus, the preemptive bribe does not
provide any information regarding the tax payers type, and consequently, none of the key
ndings regarding preemptive bribery are altered by the presence of asymmetric information.
Similarly, Marjit et al. (2000) study a model of crime where a law enforcer chooses a level of
e¤ort in order to detect a crime, and where the probability of detecting a crime is increasing
in the enforcers level of e¤ort. Potential criminals di¤er in their ability to avoid detection,
thus when law-enforcers can observe this ability, they exert more e¤ort towards detecting
higher ability criminals. When the law enforcer cannot observe an individuals ability to
avoid detection, but only knows the overall distribution of abilities then the law-enforcer
must choose a single level of e¤ort for all agents. In this case the asymmetric information
can weaken the intensity of enforcement, depending on the distribution of abilities. Finally,
our work is related to Ryvkin and Serra (2012) who study bribery within the context of
bureaucrats who illegally provide a public good in exchange for a bribe. In their model
bribery takes place under incomplete information because an individuals moral cost of paying
or accepting a bribe is unknown. Bribery is modeled as a double auction, following the model
of bargaining under assymetric information due to Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). They
show that relative to the case with complete information, corruption is less likely to occur
under incomplete information because bribe payers under-bid, and bribe takers over-bid,
relative to the true value they are willing to pay (accept). In contrast, our paper addresses
the problem of bribery within a regulatory setting with endogenous levels of inspection e¤ort.
We attempt to understand how the bribing process can itself reveal some information about
the rms level of non-compliance, and whether this can in turn inuence the e¤ectiveness
of inspections.
Following the introduction, the second section describes our model under complete infor-
mation. The third section studies extends this to incomplete information. In section 4 we
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introduce the knowledge criterion and discuss how preemptive bribery is a¤ected and the
nal section concludes.
2 Complete Information: the Benchmark Case
Consider a model with three risk-neutral players: the principal or regulator, the supervisor,
and the rm. In our benchmark model, the regulator does not make any strategic decisions.
Firms belong to one of three types (i): compliant rms with a waste level of (0) ; low-waste
rms with a waste level of (l) ; and high-waste rms with a waste level of (h) ; so that
i 2 f0; l; hg: By assumption, h > l > 0. Among the polluting rms the proportion of l types
is p and h types (1  p) and each rm knows its type. Supervisors are hired by the regulator
to investigate so that rms can be penalized according to their level of waste. Since this
game is one with complete information, the supervisor immediately observes the rms type,
therefore, the supervisors information set is, IC = ff0g; flg; fhgg: Although the supervisor
observes the rm type, this information is soft and he must exert e¤ort in order to obtain
hard evidence to use in its report to the regulator. By exerting costly e¤ort E > 0 the
supervisor can, with probability  2 (0; 1), obtain hard evidence regarding the rms waste
level fl; hg, and with probability (1  ) obtains no evidence fg. This report is denoted by
; where  2 fl; hg[ fg. The report results in the rm being ned Fi; i = fl; hg, and the
supervisor receives a reward ri  Fi: We assume that Fh > Fl > 0 and that rh = rl = r, and
that evidence is needed only for rms with positive waste, so that lack of any evidence, ,
leads to imposition of F0 = 0:5 Finally, we assume that the following condition always holds
so that we may ignore cases where E is so large (or  so small) that the supervisor receives
a negative payo¤ by exerting e¤ort and collecting evidence.
rFl   E  0 (1)
Supervisors and rms are corruptible and may choose to exchange bribe instead of the
ne. In any given interaction between the rm and the supervisor, bribery may occur at
two stages: preemptively, that is before the supervisor has discovered the rms type, or
ex-post, that is after the supervisor discovers the rms type. Under ex-post bribery the
5Note that extortion is not feasible in our model because of the requirement of hard evidence for any
reporting. An l type cannot be reported as an h type without evidence and we assume that evidence can
not be cooked.
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supervisor gathers evidence but submits a report  =  in exchange for a bribe. Thus,
conditional on the supervisor exerting E; ex-post corruption can occur only with probability
; that is only if the supervisor nds hard evidence about the rms pollution. In contrast,
with preemptive bribery the supervisor commits not to investigate further (by not exerting
e¤ort) in exchange for a bribe. This obviously means that the rm will not be ned ever,
as there is no hard evidence. If an ex-post bribe is exchanged there is some probability 
with which the regulator discovers that a bribe has been exchanged. In the event of this
leak, the supervisor is penalized Ti and the rm must pay the (avoided) ne Fi: However,
we assume that preemptive collusion is immune to such exogenous detection because the
detection probability is likely to be higher when hard evidence is present but suppressed
compared to the case where evidence has not been gathered.6 Under the assumption of
sequential rationality we solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. That
is, we rst analyze the ex-post bribery game, and then preemptive bribery.
First consider the ex-post bribery game. Since bribery is discovered with probability
 > 0, and the rm pays only Fi in the absence of any penalty for bribe giving, the type
i rm will gain by o¤ering a bribe less than (1   )Fi. On the other hand, supervisor will
accept any bribe o¤er that is greater than r Fi+Ti. Thus ex-post bribe will be exchanged
if Fi(1  r)  (Ti+Fi): Clearly, by raising r to some r > r=; this condition can be reversed
and ex-post bribery eliminated. If penalty for bribery T is xed, r= will be di¤erent for low
and high pollution levels. Alternatively, if Ti = TFi, the condition for preventing ex-post
collusion is,
r  r= = 1  (1 + T ): (2)
For the remainder of this paper, we shall assume that (2) is always satised and focus on
incentives for preemptive bribery.
We now turn to the game with preemptive bribery. Let GC denote the preemptive
bribery (and subsequent investigation) game. We assume thatGC follows a simple ultimatum
game where the rm always makes an o¤er, which the supervisor chooses to accept or
reject. Although, these assumptions may appear constricting, the key qualitative results are
unlikely to be a¤ected.7 Acceptance of the bribe o¤er implies that the supervisor will not
6This assumption is mainly to focus on situations where it is di¢ cult to prevent preemptive collusion.
See Samuel (2009) for a model where both forms of bribery are subject to detections.
7Our model implies that the rm possesses all the bargaining power. Most bribery games determine the
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investigate the rm any further, and rejection means that the supervisor exerts costly e¤ort E
to investigate and collect evidence (with probability ): In the absence of any hard evidence,
 =  and the rm does not pay any ne. If hard evidence is obtained, then given (2) the
rm pays Fi in nes and the supervisor gets rFi: A polluting rm of type i will, therefore,
o¤er (rFi   E) that will be accepted by the supervisor. Since preemptive bribery cannot
be detected, for any r  1 preemptive collusion will not be deterred regardless of whether
ex-post collusion is deterred or not. Hence our focus is on the case, r= < r < 1: Before
proceeding further, we nd it useful to denote Ui for i = f0; l; hg, as the expected payo¤s to
a rm of type i, and V as the (expected) payo¤s to the supervisor, in game GC . Equilibrium
payo¤s are denoted by Ui ; V
: In the benchmark case, we have, Ui =  [rFi   E]; i = l; h
and U0 = 0:
3 Incomplete Information and Preemptive Collusion
When the supervisor is unable to distinguish between the l and the h types, preemptive
collusion involves an uninformed supervisor. In this game with incomplete information,
the supervisor only observes whether the rm is a zero waste rm (of type 0) or positive
waste rm (of type l or h). Thus, the supervisors information set IA now has the partition
ff0g; fl; hgg: By exerting costly e¤ort E > 0 the supervisor can, with probability  2 (0; 1),
obtain hard evidence regarding the rms waste level. Note that possession of hard evidence
implies knowledge of the rms type but the reverse is not true.
[Figure 1 here]
The above bribe game, which we denote by GA; is a signalling game (Figure 1) where
a rm whose type is unknown to the supervisor makes a bribe o¤er, and where p is the
supervisors prior belief that the rm is of type l. Following a preemptive bribe o¤er B; the
supervisor updates its belief about the rms type, where q denotes the supervisors posterior
belief that the rm is of type l; q(B) = prob(i = l j B). Besides the bribe, we assume that
the supervisor does not receive any other signals. A rm of type is strategy is denoted by
the bribe o¤er Bi; where Bi  0; while the supervisors strategy is denoted by a 2 f0; 1g,
bribe within a Nash bargaining framework with equal bargaining power. However, this bargaining solution
cannot be extended easily to incomplete information settings. As an alternative to the above assumption,
we have considered another variant of the ultimatum game where the supervisor and the rm each make an
o¤er (or bribe ask) with probability :5. None of our key results are a¤ected by this change.
8
where a = 1 denotes acceptance of the bribe.8 Rejection, a = 0, leads to the supervisor
putting in the required e¤ort to collect the hard evidence. Let (a j B)  (B) be the
probability that a bribe o¤er B will be accepted.
We denote the games strategy prole as  = (Bl; Bh; (B)); and shall consider sequential
equilibria (; eq ) where  is sequentially rational given system of beliefs eq; and eq is consistent
with ; Bayes law, and the given prior p. First, we examine whether the no-collusion
outcome without any preemptive bribery is completely prevented. Then, we consider two
types of preemptive bribe equilibria: (1) pooling equilibria where both types of rms o¤er
the same positive bribe and the supervisor accepts the bribe, and (2) separating equilibria
where h types o¤er a separating bribe Bh and the l types o¤er B

l ; and the supervisor accepts
the higher bribe from the h type while rejecting the lower bribe with positive probability.
In the separating equilibrium, there is preemptive collusion with the h type but the l type
is being investigated and penalized with positive probability.9
As is well known, these games admit many equilibria which are often supported by
unreasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We use a version of the universal divinity criterion
(Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Sobel (1990)) to rene the set of equilibria. Renement
in this context essentially eliminates types for a certain strategy B if they are unlikely to
have deviated to that strategy B (given the other playersbest response to B). We use
the following condition, denoted as D1, to rene the set of equilibria (see Fudenberg- Tirole
(1991)).
Consider any particular equilibrium (; eq ) and let Ul ; Uh be the equilibrium payo¤s
of the two types in the game GA. Type i will benet from deviating to o¤er a bribe B if
Ui(B; ) > U

i : Let P be the set of mixed best responses by the supervisor for any beliefs
q over types. Let D(B; i) be the set of mixed best responses  so that type i benets from
deviating. That is,
D(B; i) = f 2 P s.t. Ui(B; (B)) > Ui g; i = l; h (3)
Similarly, dene D0(B; i) as the set of best responses by the supervisor so that type i is
8In the text, we shall focus mostly on pure strategy bribe o¤ers by the rm, except the semi-separating
equilibrium where rms can randomize over di¤erent bribe o¤ers. See the appendix for details.
9In the appendix, we also consider a third case, a semi-separating equilibrium where the both types
engage in successful preemptive bribery with positive probability, but the probability of being investigated
is higher for the l types:
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indi¤erent between the equilibrium play and deviation to o¤er B: Then,
D0(B; i) = f 2 P s.t. Ui(b; (B)) = Ui g; i = l; h (4)
Condition D1 requires that a type i is deleted for deviation B if 9j 6= i s.t.
fD(B; i) [D0(B; i)g  D(B; j) (5)
The condition requires that type i is not likely to have deviated to o¤er B if there exists
another type j such that whenever type i nds it protable to deviate, so does type j, but
the reverse is not true. An equilibrium is rejected if out of equilibrium beliefs fail to satisfy
this condition.
3.1 Preventing collusion
Recall that in the complete information benchmark case, it is not possible to prevent pre-
emptive collusion by either type of rms, whenever r < 1: In the incomplete information
case, it can be shown that it not possible to eliminate collusion by both types. We shall
argue that the no-collusion outcome cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
For the no-collusion outcome to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that Bl = B

h =
0; q = p; (B) = 0; 8B < rFh   E:10 Observe that it is not rational for the supervisor
to reject any bribe o¤er exceeding rFh   E: Thus, the no-collusion outcome cannot be
supported as an equilibrium, since the h type will always deviate and o¤er rFh  E which
will be accepted. Since r < 1; we have rFh   E < Fh; and such a deviation is always
protable.
Proposition 1 Let 1 > r  r= so that ex post collusion is not feasible. In the incomplete
information environment, it is never possible to prevent preemptive bribery completely.
This establishes that the presence of asymmetric information in itself is not su¢ cient to
deter preemptive bribery. The regulator cannot ignore this form of collusion when asym-
metric information is present. However, we shall see that compared to the benchmark case
in Section 2, there is some deterrence of preemptive bribery.We shall show that the h types
10More generally, we can have Bl = B

h = B < rFh   E: But it does not a¤ect the main argument.
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will always engage is some form for preemptive bribery in any equilibrium. The extent to
which the l types engage in bribery depends on the particular equilibrium we focus on.
3.2 Pooling: Preemptive bribery by both types
There are equilibria where both types of rms are able to enter into preemptive collusion
with the supervisor. Consider a pooling equilibrium with positive bribes Bl = Bh = B >
0, the supervisor accepts B. Let V R(q) be the expected payo¤ to the supervisor from
rejecting a bribe o¤er when its posterior belief that the rm is type l is given by q: In any
pooling equilibrium bribery does not reveal any information about the rms type. Thus,
the supervisors posterior beliefs are q = p. Therefore, the pooling bribe B must satisfy:
B  V R(p) = r[pFl + (1  p)Fh]  E:
This bribe must also be individually rational for the low types, therefore,
B < Fl:
Combining the two previous inequalities, it follows that a pooling equilibrium with preemp-
tive bribery can exist only if
[(rFh   Fl   rp(Fh   Fl)] < E: (6)
If the above condition is satised, then there exists a strategy prole ; and system of beliefeq; such that (; eq ) is a sequential equilibrium.11 This strategy prole is,
Bi = B
; i = l; h; V (p)  B
(B) =
(
1; 8B  B
0; 8B < B:
It should be noted that there is in fact a multiplicity of such pooling equilibria. Any bribe
B such that V R(p)  B < minfFl; rFh  E)g can be supported as an equilibrium. The
system of beliefs eq supporting this equilibrium is given by,
11We shall use P, S and NC to denote pooling, separating and the no-collusion cases.
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eq =
8>><>>:
p;B = B
0;8 V R(p) < B < B
p;8 B  V R(p)
It can be veried that (B) is optimal given eq.12 Both types o¤ering bribe B is also optimal
given : The system of belief given by eq above is also consistent. However, as we show in
the appendix that the above out-of-equilibrium beliefs specied by eq are not reasonable in
the sense that these beliefs do not satisfy condition D1:
3.3 Separating bribes
We consider two cases of separating equilibrium. In the rst class of separating equilibrium,
only the h type is able to engage in bribery and avoid prosecution. In the second class, both
types engage in preemptive bribery (with di¤erent bribe o¤ers) but the l type is prosecuted
with some probability while the h type escapes prosecution.
3.3.1 Preemptive bribery by the h type only
Assume that rFh   E  Fl. Consider the separating equilibrium where the high type
separates itself from the low type. Dene Bl = 0 and B

h = (rFh   E). It can be shown
that there exists a strategy prole  and system of belief eq such that (; eq ) is a sequential
equilibrium. The strategy prole  is given by
Bl = 0; B

h = rFh   E (7)
(B) =
(
1;8B  Bh
0; otherwise:
The corresponding belief system eq is given as follows:
eq = ( 1; B = 0
0; 8B > 0: (8)
12Let p= satisfy V R(p=) = B: We need q(B)  p= for all B < B : Since V R(p) < B; we have p= < p:
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The supervisor believes that any positive bribe o¤er must be from the h type. Given this
belief, the supervisor will not accept any bribe which is less than rFh   E. This is the
payo¤ the supervisor gets from rejecting a bribe o¤er when faced with the h type rm. The l
types pay no bribe and face investigation and do not benet from deviating given the beliefs
and strategy of the supervisor.
An interesting implication of the separating equilibrium is that the h types are able
to engage in preemptive bribery, where as the l types are investigated. Since we have
assumed that ex post collusion is being deterred, these l types will be prosecuted. Thus, in
a sense there is partial enforcement in this case. However, as we show in the Appendix, this
equilibrium also fails to satisfy condition D1:
3.3.2 Limited bribery and partial prosecution
We can have several separating equilibria with the l type o¤ering a non zero bribe. Unlike the
previous case (3.3.1), the existence of these equilibria does not depend on whether rFh E 
Fl or not. Here both types o¤er di¤erent bribes, but these o¤ers are accepted with di¤erent
probabilities. The h types higher o¤er is accepted with probability 1, but the l types o¤er
is rejected with some positive probability. Dene Bl = rFl E and Bh = (rFh E): The
supervisors strategy is given by,
(B) =
8>><>>:
1; for B  Bh
x; for B = Bl where x =
Fh+E rFh
Fh+E rFl ; 0 < x < 1
0; otherwise:
The corresponding belief system eq is given as follows,
eq = ( 0; B > rFl   E
1; otherwise:
(9)
Proposition 2 Let r  r= so that ex post collusion is not feasible. In this limited informa-
tion environment, there exists an equilibrium where the h type engages in preemptive bribery
and is never prosecuted and the l type engages with bribery but is prosecuted with positive
probability x 2 (0; 1). This is the only equilibrium satisfying condition D1:
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Proof. It is easy to verify that the strategy prole and beliefs specied above constitute
an equilibrium.13 The h type is indi¤erent between o¤ering Bh and B

l ; hence it has no
incentive to deviate. The l type does not benet from deviation either. Any bribe below
rFl E will be rejected and will lead to a payo¤ of  (Fl) <  [x(rFl E)+ (1 x)Fl]:
It can be veried that it will also be strictly worse o¤ by o¤ering any bribe B  Bh: For
the supervisor, rejecting any bribe o¤er lying between rFl   E and rFh   E is optimal
because the supervisor believes that such o¤er would have come only from the h type. Note
that any o¤er below rFl E will be rejected irrespective of the belief about the types. We
can verify that beliefs satisfy condition D1. Recall that equilibrium payo¤s are
Uh =  [rFh   E]; Ul =  [x(rFl   E) + (1  x)Fl]: (10)
Now consider a deviation to bribe B > rFl   E: We can nd the the set of mixed best
responses by the supervisor for which such a deviation would yield higher payo¤s compared
to the equilibrium payo¤s for the two di¤erent types. Using 5,
D(b; h) = f 2 P j  > h =
Fh + E   rFh
Fh  B g; (11)
D(b; l) = f 2 P j  > l =
x(Fl + E   rFl
Fl  B g (12)
where x =
Fh + E   rFh
Fh + E   rFl
Since (h  l) = (rFl  E  B)(Fh  Fl) < 0; 8B > rFl  E it follows that fD(B; l)[
D0(B; l)g  D(b; h): Hence according to D1, given any bribe o¤er in excess of rFl  E the
supervisor should believe that the o¤er would have been made by the h type rather than the
l type. This is what the beliefs as given in 9 specify. In the Appendix we show that no other
equilibrium satises condition D1.
This equilibrium shows that the l types does get prosecuted with some probability. In-
complete information, in this sense, does reduce preemptive bribery and raises prosecution.
Further, the following proposition shows that the lack of information regarding the rms
type does a¤ect many previous results concerning preemptive bribery.
13We have not provided any arguments regarding its existence. To show that such a construction exists,
it su¢ ces to note that 0 < x < 1: Suppose p = 1=2; Fh = 40; Fl = 20; E = 2;  = 3=5; r = 3=4: The h
type o¤ers 16 which is accepted, the l type o¤ers 7 which is accepted with probability 8=17: So the l type is
prosecuted with probability 9=17:
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Proposition 3 In an equilibrium that satises D1, the following comparative statics hold.
The likelihood of prosecution of the l types is increasing in r, , and Fh, but decreasing in
Fl: The likelihood of prosecuting the h types in una¤ected by changes in these parameters.
Proof. From the expression for x in Proposition 1, we can verify that @x
@r
< 0; @x
@
<
0; @x
@Fl
> 0 and @x
@Fh
< 0. Since the probability of prosecution is simply (1   x), the claim in
the proposition easily follows.
These results are interesting in light of previous results regarding preemptive bribery (as
discussed in Bag 1998, Samuel 2009). Specically, when preemptive bribery occurs under
full information, an increase in the supervisors ability to monitor the , an increase in E;
and an increase in f always increase the incentives for preemptive bribery. In contrast, with
incomplete information an increase in  reduces the frequency of preemptive bribery by the
low types (by lowering x), while not a¤ecting the incentives for bribery among the high
types. However, an increase in E raises x thereby increasing the frequency of preemptive
bribery among the low types. Further the nes have opposing e¤ects in that an increase
in Fl increases the frequency of bribery among l types, whereas an increase in Fh decreases
the frequency of bribery among l types, but neither of these nes impact the likelihood of
bribery among h types.14 We discuss the implications of these results for corruption policy
in the conclusion.
4 Knowledge Criterion and Preemptive bribery
In the previous section, we have implicitly assumed that the probability, ; of gathering hard
information or veriable evidence is independent of whether the supervisor is knowledgeable
about the rms type or not. This assumption is present in di¤erent forms in much of the
literature. In many models (i.e. Mookherjee and Png 1995), all information is hard informa-
tion and hence there is no di¤erence between detection of types and evidence gathering. In
models where a distinction between hard and soft information is made (i.e. Samuel 2009),
the supervisor always knows the types but to gather hard information (or what we have also
referred to as veriable evidence) the supervisor needs to incur positive cost. In contrast,
here the supervisor does not know the types to start with but it can learn about the types
14This also opens up the possibility that the regulator might impose di¤eret nes for rms even when they
generate the same social harm, in order to create articial types.
15
without (and before) collecting evidence.15 The key question here is: does prior knowledge
of the types make it easier to collect evidence? We believe that in many settings it does. For
example, a suspect in a criminal trial may admit to the crime. Often this admission of guilt
is inadmissible in court, nevertheless this knowledge can make it easier for a detective to nd
hard evidence against the suspect. Similarly, it is common for an investigative journalist to
know of a particular political scandal (perhaps because the knowledge is obtained through
unnamed sources"). However, this very knowledge can make it easier for the journalist to
obtain hard evidence regarding this scandal.
In this present context in a separating equilibrium the act of exchanging a bribe itself
must reveal something about the rm type since each type of rm o¤ers a di¤erent bribe.
Although this information may not be hard (i.e. third party veriable), it will make it easier
for the supervisor to obtain hard evidence regarding the rms type. We operationalize
the concept that knowledge translates into more e¤ective evidence gathering, through the
following Knowledge Criterion.
Knowledge Criterion: Suppose the supervisor believes the rm to be of a certain
type with probability one, the probability (=) of obtaining hard information against this
particular type, upon exerting e¤ort E, is always higher than the probability () of obtaining
hard information against a type of rm that the supervisor is not sure about.
In this section we require that all equilibria (discussed earlier) should satisfy the Knowl-
edge Criterion (KC). In other words, we require that 0 = (1) > (q); for q < 1:For
simplicity we assume that 0 = 1: It is clear that many of the equilibria discussed earlier
will be a¤ected by this criterion. Note that previously, the h types were always able to
separate from the other type and engage in preemptive bribery. But now there is a trade-o¤,
once revealed, the expected rewards to the supervisor will be higher and the minimum bribe
required to engage in preemptive bribery will also be higher. This will act as a disincentive
for preemptive collusion. The following proposition conrms this.
Proposition 4 Suppose r >  & r > r=: The no-collusion outcome can be implemented as
the unique equilibrium of the preemptive bribery game satisfying the Knowledge Criterion if
the ne for the h type can be raised su¢ ciently.
Proof. Note that we continue to assume r  r= so that ex post collusion is always
15It is quite common for agents, in various economic settings, to learn or know through communication,
signalling and di¤erent methods of inference.
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prevented. First, we show that the no-collusion outcome can be an equilibrium. Consider
the equilibrium strategy prole
NC : B

l = 0; B

h = 0; 
(B) = 0;8B  rFh   E: (13)
The corresponding belief system is given by,
eqNC = ( p; B = 0
0; B > 0:
It is easy to verify that (NC ; eqNC) is an equilibrium if Fh  rFh   E: By not entering in
to a preemptive bribery deal, the rm faces full penalty Fh, but with a reduced probability
 < 1. With preemptive bribery, given KC, it has to pay a higher bribe rFh   E. In the
absence of KC, the minimal separating o¤er by the h type is rFh   E; whereas with KC
this goes up to rFh   E: Hence to guarantee the existence of this equilibrium we need
r  + E
Fh
; or Fh  E
r   : (14)
Hence the h type will prefer to be inspected if condition (14) is satised, rFh   E > Fh;
which reduces to (r   )Fh > E: Thus we can not have any separating equilibrium.
Secondly, as discussed earlier all the pooling equilibria (??) can be eliminated if 6 is
reversed, that is,
Fh  F =h ; where [(rF =h   Fl   rp(F =h   Fl)] = Fl: (15)
Hence, if we choose Fh  max(F =h ; Er ); the no-collusion equilibrium is unique.
This shows that a combination of high rewards for the supervisor and high nes for the
h type rms can deter both forms of collusion. Our analysis relied heavily on the regulators
ability to set Fh at a su¢ ciently high level. This may not be feasible for various reasons,
for example, nes might be subject to some limited liability constraints. Moreover, the
knowledge criterion makes a signicant impact only when  is not too large. As  is raised
preemptive bribery becomes more attractive and it may not be possible to guarantee the no-
collusion outcome.
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5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to understand the implications of the informational environment in
which bribery takes place and study its relationship to the timing of bribery (i.e. preemptive
or ex post). We show that the incentives for preemptive bribery are strongly inuenced by
introducing asymmetric information. However, the degree of inuence depends on whether
the prior knowledlge of types makes it easier to collect evidence (knowledge criterion).
In the absence of the knowledge criterion asymmetric information prevents preemptive
bribery, but only to a limited extent. Specically, with asymmetric information h types
always engage in preemptive bribery while l types do so with some probability and are
prosecuted the rest of the time (Proposition 2). To the extent that it is socially desirable
to prevent preemptive bribery, it is clear that the presence of two types with asymmetric
information, and higher nes for one type, has made it possible to prevent some bribery.
However, an outcome in which neither types (ever) engage in bribery cannot be sustained
as an equilibrium.
The results of Proposition 2 are interesting in light of recent empirical ndings by Babu
et al. (2012) who nd that smaller rms are prosecuted more often, while larger rms are
able to bribe their way out of being prosecuted. In our model high polluting rms are always
able to separate themselves from small rms, and are never prosecuted. Thus, Proposition
1 o¤ers some theoretical support for this nding.
We also show that many results which apply to preemptive bribery under full information
are no longer valid under asymmetric information (Proposition 3). Bac (1998), Bag(1997),
and Samuel (2009) show that an improvement in the supervisorsability to monitor the rm,
or an increase in the cost of monitoring E; always encourages preemptive bribery. In contrast,
here an improvement in the supervisors monitoring technology reduces the frequency of
preemptive bribery, whereas an increase in the cost of monitoring increases the frequency of
preemptive bribery. Thus, in contrast to these previous papers who argue that improvements
in the monitoring technology may not be desirable since they encourage bribery, here we show
that in the presence of asymmetric information, improvements in monitoring technology may
be desirable.
A second important distinction from the results under full information is regarding the
nes for the original act of non-compliance. Under full information an increase in the ne
always encourages bribery (among all types). In contrast, in our model an increase in the
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ne for the h types reduces the likelihood of bribery among the low types, while an increase
in the ne for the l types increases the likelihood of bribery among the l types. Thus, by
raising the ne of the h types the frequency of prosecution of the l types can be improved.
The implications of asymmetric information for preemptive bribery is magnied under the
knowlege criterion. Without the kc preemptive bribery benets at least the h types because
the coaltion benets from avoiding costs E; without any tradeo¤. With the knowledge
criterion, knowledge obtained through the bribing process makes evidence gathering more
e¤ective. Consequently, the h typesincentive to separate and engage in preemptive bribery
now comes at a cost, and the minimum bribe required to separate is signicantly higher
under the knowledge criterion. Thus, in contrast to the case without the knowledge criterion,
preemptive bribery can be eliminated completely under certain reasonable conditions.
6 Appendix
In the following paragraphs we examine the various equilibria discussed in the text to see
whether the out-of-equilibrium beliefs specied by these equilibria are deemed reasonable.
As mentioned in the text, we consider a version of the Universal Divinity criterion and refer
to it as condition D1.
1. Semi-separating equilibrium
Besides the pooling and separating equilibria, we can also have equilibria with semi-
separation. Assume rFh   E > Fl: The h   type randomizes between separating by
o¤ering a high bribe (Bh) and pooling with the l   type with a lower bribe (B): Let (B)
be the probability that the h  type o¤ers bribe B: The supervisor accepts the higher bribe
o¤er Bh with probability one, but randomizes between acceptance and rejection following
bribe o¤er B: It can be shown that the following strategy prole P ; and system of beliefeqP ; constitute a sequential equilibrium. The strategy prole  is given by
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B = Fl; Bh = rFh   E;
h(B) =
(1  r)Fh + E
(Fh   Fl) ; 
l(B) = 1; h(Bh) = 1  h(B) (16)
(B) = 1;8B  Bh
= x; B = B where x =
p(Fl + E   rFl)
(1  p)(rFh   Fl   E)
= 0; otherwise.
The corresponding beliefs are given by
q(B) = 0;8B  rFh   E (17)
= bq = rFh   E   Fl
rFh   rFl > 0; B = Fl (18)
= 0;8B < Fl
Verication of equilibrium is easy.16 Faced with a bribe of Fl, the supervisor believes
that the probability that the rm is l   type is bq < 1: Given bq; the supervisor is indi¤erent
between accepting and rejecting. However, note that for this to be an equilibrium, the
supervisor must not accept bribe below Fl: Hence we require the supervisor to believe that
a bribe o¤er B; rFl   E < B < Fl; would be more likely to have been made by h type.17
This belief is not reasonable and we can verify that it does not satisfy D1:
Fix this equilibrium and a deviation to bribe b; rFl   E < B < Fl: Equilibrium
payo¤s of the two types are Uh =  [rFh   E]; Ul =  [Fl]:Type h would deviate to b if
b + (1   )Fh < rFh   E where  is the probability that b will be accepted. Hence
Jh = f 2 P j  > h = Fh+E rFhFh b < 1g: For the l type deviation to b is protable i¤
b + (1   )Fl < Fl: Hence Jl = f 2 P j  > 0g. Clearly, Jh  Jl: Hence the l type is
more likely to have deviated to b: Beliefs specied in () do not satisfy this.
16Consider the earlier example (footnote ). Suppose p = 1=2; Fh = 40; Fl = 20; E = 2;  = 3=5; r = 3=4:
The h type o¤ers 16 with probability 1=8 and o¤ers 12 with probability 7=8. The l type o¤ers 12 with
probability 1:The supervisor accepts the higher o¤ers with probability 1: It accepts the lower o¤er with
probability 2=3. Faced with a bribe o¤er of 12; the supervisor believes the probability of the sender being
l type to be 8=15:
17Note that rFl   E < Fl since r < 1:
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2. Separating Equilibrium
Suppose rFh   E > Fl. Consider the separating equilibrium discussed in the text 7,
B = 0; Bh = rFh   E: Equilibrium payo¤s of the two types are Uh =  [rFh   E]; Ul =
 [Fl]: Note that here payo¤s are identical to the earlier semi separating case. Consider a
deviation to bribe b > rFl E: This case is identical to the case above and same arguments
apply, Jh(b)  Jl(b). Out-of-equilibrium belief q(l j b) = 0 is not consistent with D1.
Note that we do not have separating equilibria of this type when rFh   E < Fl: The
only separating equilibrium in such a case will be the one discussed Proposition 1.
3. Pooling Equilibrium
Let rFh   E < Fl; note that it is a su¢ cient condition for the pooling equilibrium
to exist. This implies that the necessary condition as given in 6 is satised. Consider the
pooling equilibrium with Bh = B

l = B
 = r[pFl + (1   p)Fh]   E: This is the smallest
possible equilibrium bribe in a pooling situation. Consider a deviation to bribe b; r[pFl +
(1   p)Fh]   E > b > rFl   E: Equilibrium payo¤s of the two types are Uh = Ul =  B.
Like before we can nd the set of mixed best responses by the supervisor so that deviation by
the rm would be protable. It is easy to check that Jh(b) = f 2 P j  > h = Fh BFh b < 1g
and Jh(b) = f 2 P j  > l = Fl BFl b < 1g. Once again, Jh(b)  Jl(b) implying that
type l is more likely to have deviated. This is not consistent with the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs required to sustain the pooling equilibrium. Similar arguments can be applied to
other pooling equilibria.
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